A New Defense of Old-School Conceptual Analysis

Abstract:

Traditional conceptual analysis aims at reaching reductive definitions of properties or relations (e.g. goodness) by investigating the conceptual meanings of natural language terms (e.g. 'good'). This project stands in disrepute today following the development of semantic externalism ("meaning ain't in the head") and the popular appeal of the Millian view that the meaning of a referring term is just its reference. I propose a way of reconciling traditional conceptual analysis with Millianism specifically for property-predicating terms like 'good', animated by the idea that "the mark of the mental is intentionality". Our concept of a thing, or its cognitive significance for us, just is an individuating property of that thing. In the case of entity/substance-referring terms like 'Aristotle' and 'water', our concept is necessarily distinct from the meaning or reference. But in the case of property-predicating terms like 'good' there is another, direct option: our concept may just be the property itself. In this case, conceptual analysis is metaphysical reduction.