

Allan Hazlett

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Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, 1 Brookings Drive, St. Louis 63109 USA

Education

Brown University (2000 – 2006): MA 2003 (Philosophy), PhD 2006 (Philosophy). Dissertation: *Grice's Razor and Moore's Gambit*. Advisor: Ernest Sosa.

University of Illinois at Chicago (1997 – 2000): BA 2000 (Philosophy, with Honors).

Appointments

2024 –	Washington University in St. Louis: Professor of Philosophy
2023 – 2026	African Center for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, University of Johannesburg: Senior Research Associate
2019 – 2024	Washington University in St. Louis: Associate Professor of Philosophy
2017 – 2019	Washington University in St. Louis: Assistant Professor of Philosophy
2015 – 2017	University of New Mexico: Assistant Professor of Philosophy
2013 – 2015	University of Edinburgh: Reader in Philosophy
2010 – 2013	University of Edinburgh: Lecturer in Philosophy
2011 (Summer)	Dartmouth College: Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy
2007 – 2010	Fordham University: Assistant Professor of Philosophy
2006 – 2007	Texas Tech University: Assistant Professor of Philosophy
2005 – 2006	Texas Tech University: Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy

Non-academic leaves of absence

2019 (Fall)	Parental leave
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Professional service

2024 –	Editor, <i>Social Epistemology</i> category, Philpapers.org
2023 – 2026	Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research, American Philosophical Association
2018 – 2019	Vice President (2018) and President (2019), Central States Philosophical Association
2012 – 2015	Secretary, Scots Philosophical Association
2014 – 2015	Editorial Board, <i>The Philosophical Quarterly</i>

Memberships

- American Philosophical Association

- Scots Philosophical Association

Grants and fellowships

- 2024-2025: grants from the Frick Initiative (\$28,250), the American Philosophical Association (\$1,000), and the Center for the Humanities at Washington University in St. Louis (\$750) to support a one-week Summer Philosophy Academy for members of the philosophy discussion group at University City High School.
- 2023 – present: seed grants from the Frick Initiative (\$74,450) and the Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy (\$35,500) at Washington University in St. Louis to support the Civil Society Initiative, a project that supports teaching, research, and public engagement on responsible democratic citizenship.
- Summer 2022: Summer Research Grant (\$7,000), Center for the Humanities, Washington University in St. Louis. Topic: *Epistemic Norms as Social Norms*.
- Fall 2020: Faculty Fellowship, Center for the Humanities, Washington University in St. Louis. Topic: *The Wages of Authenticity*.
- 2013 – 2014: Early Career Fellowship (£103,000), Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK). Topic: *Intellectual Virtue and the Good Life: Ethical and Epistemic Values*.
- 2013: Conference grants (£4,500), Scots Philosophical Association and Mind Association. Topic: *The Gettier Problem at 50*.
- 2012: Small Research Grant (£1,195), British Academy. Topic: *Knowledge, Coherence, and the Good Life: Ethical and Epistemological Goods*.
- 2012: Conference grants (£2,800), Scots Philosophical Association and Mind Association. Topic: *The Aims of Inquiry and Cognition*.
- 2007 – 2009: interdisciplinary faculty seminar grants (\$6,000), Mellon Foundation. Topics: *Secularism, Secularism and Islam*, and *Philosophical Foundations of Secularism*.
- 2006 – 2007: public lecture series grants (\$3,000), Humanities Texas (National Endowment for the Humanities).

Honors and awards

In 2007 I received the Rutgers Young Epistemologist Prize, for “The Myth of Factive Verbs.”

In 2000 I was inducted into Phi Beta Kappa.

Books

The Epistemology of Desire and the Problem of Nihilism (Oxford University Press, 2024).

A Critical Introduction to Skepticism (Bloomsbury, 2014).

A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief (Oxford University Press, 2013).

Papers and chapters

“From Doxastic Blame to Doxastic Shame,” *Ergo* (forthcoming).

“Authenticity as Transparency,” *Inquiry* (forthcoming).

“Understanding and Testimony,” in J. Lackey and A. McGlynn (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

“Testimony, Understanding, and Art Criticism,” in A. King (ed.), *Philosophy and Art: New Essays at the Intersection* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

“Does Common Sense Conflict with Skepticism?” (with Krista Lawlor), in B. Roeber, M. Steup, J. Turri, and E. Sosa (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, third edition (Blackwell, 2024), pp. 305-28.

“Propositional Faith and Trustworthiness,” *Religious Studies* 59 (2023), pp. 434-47, part of a special issue on

Normative Appraisals of Faith in God edited by Daniel McKaughan and Daniel Howard-Snyder.

“Desire and Goodness,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 105 (2022), pp. 160-80.

“The Value of Common Knowledge,” *Synthese* 200 (2022), article 11, part of a special issue on *New Directions in Social Epistemology* edited by J. Adam Carter and Christoph Kelp.

“Populism, Expertise, and Intellectual Autonomy,” in M. Berhow, G. Petersen, and G. Tsakiridis (eds.), *Engaging Populism: Democracy and the Intellectual Virtues* (Palgrave, 2022), pp. 89-106.

“The Aim of Suspension,” *Res Philosophica* 99(4) (2022), pp. 467-74, part of a symposium on Ernest Sosa’s *Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity and What It Explains*.

“Desire that Amounts to Knowledge,” *Philosophical Quarterly* 71(1) (2021), pp. 56-73.

“What Should Humeans Say about Rationality?,” *Analysis* 81(1) (2021), pp. 144-56, part of a symposium on Errol Lord’s *The Importance of Being Rational*.

“Fitting Inconsistency and Reasonable Irresolution,” (with Simon D. Feldman) in D.E. Gatzia and B. Brogaard (eds.), *The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds* (Routledge, 2021), pp. 131-46.

“Intellectual Trust and the Marketplace of Ideas,” in M.P. Lynch and A. Tanesini (eds.), *Polarization, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives* (Routledge, 2021), pp. 73-87.

“False Intellectual Humility,” in M. Alfano, M.P. Lynch, and A. Tanesini (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility* (Routledge, 2021), pp. 313-25.

“Truthfulness without Truth,” *Journal of Philosophical Research* 45 (2021), pp. 115-31.

“Critical Injustice,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 57(2) (2020), pp. 129-44.

“The Guise of the Good and the Problem of Partiality,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 49(6) (2019), pp. 851-72.

“Moorean Pragmatics, Social Comparisons, and Common Knowledge,” in P.J. Graham and N.J.L.L. Pedersen (eds.), *Epistemic Entitlement* (Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 240-53.

“Skepticism,” in H. Battaly (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology* (Routledge, 2019), pp. 221-31.

“Correctness and Goodness,” in C. Kyriacou and R. McKenna (eds.), *Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism* (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2018), pp. 197-216.

“Theory of Knowledge without (Comparative) Linguistics,” in M. Mizumoto, S. Stich, and E. McReady (eds.), *Epistemology for the Rest of the World* (Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 251-66.

“Understanding and Structure,” in S. Grimm (ed.), *Making Sense of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding* (Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 135-58.

“Imagination that Amounts to Knowledge from Fiction,” in H. Bradley, E. Sullivan-Bissett, and P. Noordhof (eds.), *Art and Belief* (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 119-34.

“Intellectual Pride,” in J.A. Carter and E.C. Gordon (eds.), *The Moral Psychology of Pride* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), pp. 79-98.

“Towards Social Accounts of Testimonial Asymmetries,” *Noûs* 51(1) (2017), pp. 49-73.

“On the Special Insult of Refusing Testimony,” *Philosophical Explorations* 20(S1) (2017), pp. S37-S51, part of a special issue on *False but Useful Beliefs* edited by Lisa Bortolotti and Emma Sullivan-Bissett.

“The Social Value of Non-Deferential Belief,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 94 (1) (2016), pp. 131-51.

“What Does “Epistemic” Mean?,” *Episteme* 13(4) (2016), pp. 539-47.

“Intellectual Loyalty,” *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism* 6 (2016), pp. 326-50, part of a special issue on *Hinge Epistemology* edited by Annalisa Coliva and Danièle Moyal-Sharrock.

“The Civic Virtues of Skepticism, Intellectual Humility, and Intellectual Criticism,” in J. Baehr (ed.), *Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology* (Routledge, 2016), pp. 71-94.

“Multi-Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox” (with Kenneth Boyce), *Ratio* 29(1) (2016), pp. 29-41.

“Epistemic Goods,” in G. Fletcher (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being* (Routledge, 2016), pp. 259-70.

“The Normativity of Mind-World Relations: Comments on Sosa,” *Episteme* 12(2) (2015), pp. 167-71.

“Expressivism and Convention-Relativism about Epistemic Discourse,” in A. Fairweather and O. Flanagan (eds.), *Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 223-46.

“Entitlement and Mutually Recognized Reasonable Disagreement,” *Episteme* 11(1) (2014), pp. 1-25.

“The Metaphysics of Race” (with Alyssa Ney), in A. Ney, *Metaphysics: An Introduction* (Routledge, 2014), pp. 259-79.

“Authenticity and Self-Knowledge” (with Simon D. Feldman), *dialectica* 67(2) (2013), pp. 157-81.

“What’s Bad about Bad Faith?” (with Simon D. Feldman), *European Journal of Philosophy* 21(1) (2013), pp. 50-73.

“Against Repeatable Artworks,” in C. Mag Uidhir (ed.), *Art and Abstract Objects* (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 161-78.

“Realism and Relativism,” in J. Turri (ed.), *Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa* (Springer, 2013), pp. 33-53.

“Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge,” *Acta Analytica* 27(4) (2012), pp. 461-78.

“Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility,” *Episteme* 9(3) (2012), pp. 205-23.

“Non-Moral Evil,” *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 36 (2012), pp. 18-34.

“Color Objectivism and Color Projectivism,” (with Edward Wilson Averill), *Philosophical Psychology* 24(6) (2011), pp. 751-65.

“How the Past Depends on the Future,” *Ratio* 24(2) (2011), pp. 167-75.

“Unrealistic Fictions” (with Christy Mag Uidhir), *American Philosophical Quarterly* 48(1) (2011), pp. 33-46.

“A Problem for Relational Theories of Color” (with Edward Wilson Averill), *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 81(1) (2010), pp. 140-5.

“The Myth of Factive Verbs,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 80(3) (2010), pp. 497-522.

“Brutal Individuation,” in A. Hazlett (ed.), *New Waves in Metaphysics* (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010), pp. 72-90.

- “How to Defend Response Moralism,” *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 49(3) (2009), pp. 241-55.
- “Knowledge and Conversation,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 78(3) (2009), pp. 591-620.
- “Grice’s Razor,” *Metaphilosophy* 38(5) (2007), pp. 669-690.
- “Disassembly and Destruction,” *The Monist* 89(3) (2006), pp. 418-33.
- “Epistemic Conceptions of Begging the Question,” *Erkenntnis* 65(3) (2006), pp. 343-63.
- “How to Defeat Belief in the External World,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 87(2) (2006), pp. 198-212.
- “Possible Evils,” *Ratio* 19(2) (2006), pp. 191-8.

Reviews

- Review of S. Goldberg, *To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity* (Oxford University Press, 2018), *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (October 6th, 2018).
- Review of A. Kearn, *Sources of Knowledge: On the Concept of a Rational Capacity for Knowledge* (Harvard University Press, 2017), *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (May 23rd, 2017).
- Review of J. Gibbons, *The Norm of Belief* (Oxford University Press 2013), *Philosophical Review* 124(2) (2015), pp. 272-5.
- Review of M. Lynch, *In Praise of Reason* (MIT Press, 2012), *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism* 4(1) (2014), pp. 75-9.
- Review of J. Brown and M. Gerken (eds.), *Knowledge Ascriptions* (Oxford University Press, 2012), *Analysis Reviews* 73(4) (2013), pp. 807-9.
- Review of R. Audi, *Rationality and Religious Commitment* (Oxford University Press, 2011), *Mind* 122(485) (2013), pp. 249-53.
- Review of J. Brown and H. Cappelen (eds.), *Assertion: New Philosophical Essays* (Oxford University Press, 2011) (with Robin McKenna and Joey Pollock), *Mind* 121(483) (2012), pp. 784-8.
- Review of D. Sobel and S. Wall (eds.), *Reasons for Action* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), *Philosophical Quarterly* 62(247) (2012), pp. 413-15.
- Review of J.R. Koons, *Pragmatic Reasons: A Defense of Morality and Epistemology* (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009), *Philosophical Quarterly* 62(247) (2012), pp. 408-10.
- Review of J.K. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and H.S. Silverstein (eds.), *Knowledge and Skepticism* (MIT Press, 2010), *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (January 3rd, 2011).
- Review of S. Soames, *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century*, two volumes (Princeton University Press, 2003 and 2005), *International Philosophical Quarterly* 50(1) (2010), pp. 131-6.
- Review of J.D. Velleman, *How We Get Along* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (November 14th, 2009).
- Review of B. Taylor, *Models, Truth, and Realism* (Oxford University Press, 2006), *Philosophical Review* 117 (2008), pp. 630-3.
- Review of Z. Plyshyn, *Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World* (MIT Press, 2007), *International Philosophical Quarterly* 48 (2008), pp. 544-6.
- Review of C. Grau (ed.), *Philosophers Explore the Matrix* (Oxford University Press, 2005), *Notre Dame*

Philosophical Reviews (January 15, 2006).

Edited volumes

The Gettier Problem at 50, special issue of *Philosophical Studies*, Volume 172, Issue 1 (2015).

New Waves in Metaphysics (Palgrave-MacMillan, 2010).

References

- Jessica Brown, University of St. Andrews (jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk)
- John Greco, Georgetown University (john.greco@georgetown.edu)
- Sanford Goldberg, Northwestern University (s-goldberg@northwestern.edu)
- Michael Lynch, University of Connecticut (mplynch@uconn.edu)
- Ernest Sosa, Rutgers University (sosaern@gmail.com)