

JAMES (JAKE) QUILTY-DUNN  
Washington University in St. Louis  
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**EMPLOYMENT:**

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy & PNP Program (Fall 2020–)

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

Research Fellow, Faculty of Philosophy (2017–2020)

William Golding Junior Research Fellow, Brasenose College (2018–2020)

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**EDUCATION:**

THE GRADUATE CENTER, CUNY

Ph.D., Philosophy (awarded 2017)

Dissertation title: *Syntax and Semantics of Perceptual Representation*

Advisors: Jesse Prinz & Eric Mandelbaum

Committee: Ned Block, Tatiana Aloi Emmanouil, David Papineau

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

B.A., Philosophy (awarded 2011)

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**AOS:**

Philosophy of mind, psychology, & cognitive science; History of early modern philosophy

**AOC:**

Epistemology; Philosophy of language; Ethics

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**PUBLICATIONS** (\*=peer-reviewed):

BOOKS

*The Divided Mind: A Philosophical Introduction*. Under contract, Routledge (with Eric Mandelbaum).

JOURNAL ARTICLES

1. \*Quilty-Dunn, J. (Forthcoming). "Polysemy and Thought: Toward a Generative Theory of Concepts." *Mind & Language*.
2. \*Green, E.J., & Quilty-Dunn, J. (Forthcoming). "What Is an Object File?" *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*.

3. \*Epstein, M., Quilty-Dunn, J., Mandelbaum, E., & Emmanouil, T. (2020). "The Outlier Paradox: The Role of Iterative Ensemble Coding in Discounting Outliers." *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance* 46(11), 1267–1279.
4. Quilty-Dunn, J. (2020). "Concepts and Predication from Perception to Cognition." *Philosophical Issues* 30(1), 273–292.
5. \*Quilty-Dunn, J. (2020). "Is Iconic Memory Iconic?" *Philosophy & Phenomenological Research* 101(3), 660–682. (Winner of 2020 William James Prize, ASSC)
6. \*Quilty-Dunn, J. (2020). "Perceptual Pluralism." *Noûs* 54(4), 807–838.
7. \*Quilty-Dunn, J. (2020). "Attention and Encapsulation." *Mind & Language* 35(3), 335–349.
8. \*Rappaport, J., & Quilty-Dunn, J. (2020). "Stand-up Comedy, Authenticity, and Assertion." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 78(4), 477–490.
9. \*Quilty-Dunn, J. (2019). "Unconscious Perception and Phenomenal Coherence." *Analysis* 79(3), 461–469.
10. \*Quilty-Dunn, J. (2019). "Reid's Doxastic Theory of Perception." *Philosophers' Imprint* 19(31), 1–11.
11. \*Berger, J., Nanay, B., & Quilty-Dunn, J. (2018). "Unconscious Perceptual Justification." *Inquiry* 61(5–6), 569–589.
12. \*Quilty-Dunn, J., & Mandelbaum, E. (2018). "Against Dispositionalism: Belief in Cognitive Science." *Philosophical Studies* 175(9), 2353–2372.
13. \*Quilty-Dunn, J., & Mandelbaum, E. (2018). "Inferential Transitions." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 96(3), 532–547.
14. Quilty-Dunn, J. (2016). "Iconicity and the Format of Perception." *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 23(3–4), 255–263.
15. \*Quilty-Dunn, J. (2015). "Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual-Component Theory." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 96, 550–575.
16. \*Quilty-Dunn, J. (2015). "Believing Our Eyes: The Role of False Belief in the Experience of Cinema." *British Journal of Aesthetics* 55(3), 269–283.
17. Mandelbaum, E., & Quilty-Dunn, J. (2015). "Believing without Reason, or Why Liberals Shouldn't Watch Fox News." *Harvard Review of Philosophy* 22, 42–52.
18. \*Quilty-Dunn, J. (2013). "Was Reid a Direct Realist?" *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 21(2), 302–323.
19. \*Quilty-Dunn, J. (2013). "Reid on Olfaction and Secondary Qualities." *Frontiers in Psychology* 974(4), doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00974.

BOOK CHAPTERS

20. Quilty-Dunn, J., & Mandelbaum, E. (2020). “Noninferential Transitions: Imagery and Association.” In A. Nes & T. Chan (Eds.), *Inference and Consciousness* (London: Routledge), 151–171.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

21. \*Quilty-Dunn, J. (Forthcoming). “Rationalization Is Irrational and Self-Serving, but Useful.” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*.  
—Brief commentary on Fiery Cushman’s target article, “Rationalization Is Rational”
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WORKS IN PROGRESS

- “Unconscious Rationalization, or: How (Not) to Think about Awfulness and Death”  
—currently under revise & resubmit at *Philosophers’ Imprint*  
“Perceptual Attribution and Perceptual Reference” (with E.J. Green)  
—currently under review at *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*  
“Sensory Binding without Sensory Individuals”  
—currently in preparation for an edited volume  
“The Representational Format of Perception”  
—currently in preparation for *Philosophical Compass*
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AWARDS & FELLOWSHIPS:

ASSOCIATION FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

William James Prize, 2020

—Best published paper on consciousness by early-career researcher  
(for “Is Iconic Memory Iconic?”)

SOUTHERN SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Richard M. Griffith Prize, 2018

—Best philosophy submission by author within five years of Ph.D.  
(for “Unconscious Perception and Phenomenal Coherence”)

Graduate Student Travel Grant, 2017

EUROPEAN SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Fabian Dorsch Prize, 2017

—Best philosophy or psychology submission on perception or imagination  
(for “Attention and Encapsulation”)

SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

William James Prize, 2016

—Best philosophy or psychology submission by graduate student  
(for “Representational Format and the Perception–Cognition Border”)

NEH SUMMER INSTITUTE: PRESUPPOSITION AND PERCEPTION  
Participant, 2016

ANTWERP CENTRE FOR PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY  
Essay Prize, 2015  
—Best essay by early career researcher  
(for “Iconicity and the Format of Perception”)

BRITISH SOCIETY OF AESTHETICS  
Essay Prize, 2014  
—Best essay by early career researcher  
(for “Believing Our Eyes: The Role of False Belief in the Experience of Cinema”)

THE GRADUATE CENTER, CUNY  
Dissertation Completion Fellowship, 2016–2017  
Doctoral Student Research Grant, 2014  
Provost Summer Research Grant, 2014  
Enhanced Chancellor’s Fellowship, 2011–2016

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**PRESENTATIONS** (\*=invited, ^=presented by co-author):

- \*“Is Iconic Memory Iconic?”, William James Prize talk, Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, June 2020
- \*“Perceptual Attribution and Perceptual Reference” at Institute of Philosophy, University of London, June 2020
- “Concepts as Generative Pointers” at Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Princeton University, June 2020 (*postponed until June 2021*)
- \*“Object Files, Concepts, and Property Attribution” at Mental Files Workshop, University of Salzburg, May 2020
- \*“Conceptual Atomism and Polysemy” at Workshop on Word Meaning, Polysemy and Concepts, Linguistics Department, UCL, December 2019
- \*“Unconscious Rationalization, or: How (Not) to Think about Awfulness and Death” at the Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, October 2019
- \*“Unconscious Rationalization, or: How (Not) to Think About Awfulness and Death” at Epistemology Seminar, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, July 2019
- \*“Concepts as Generative Pointers” at Concepts, Pointers, and Occasion-Specific Thoughts, University of London, June 2019

- \*“Concepts and Stimulation: On Camp’s ‘Putting Thoughts to Work’” at Varieties of Intentionality, The New School for Social Research, May 2019
- \*“Concepts as Generative Pointers” at University of Warwick, April 2019
- \*“Perceptual Pluralism” at Perception: A Natural Kind?, Institut Jean Nicod, April 2019
- \*“Perceptual Icons” at Winter Workshop in Philosophy of Perception, UC San Diego, February 2019
- \*“Perceptual Icons” at Representational Kinds Workshop, University of Tuebingen, December 2018
- \*“Re-thinking Psychofunctionalism” at Belief and Belief Acquisition Workshop, University of Antwerp, November 2018
- \*“Perceptual Icons” at Depiction, Pictorial Experience, & Vision Science, University of Glasgow, November 2018
- \*“Concepts as Generative Pointers” at New College of the Humanities, October 2018
- \*“Attention and Encapsulation” at Workshop on Attention and Perceptual Capacities, Tjøme, Norway, August 2018
- \*“Unconscious Inference and Association” at Workshop on Conscious and Unconscious Inferences, Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, June 2018
- \*“Seeing Objects: A Case Study in the Under-Intellectualization of Perception” at Content and Conceptuality Workshop, LOGOS, University of Barcelona, May 2018
- \*“The Lower Border of Spinozan Belief” at Belief Default Symposium: Implications of the Spinozan Belief Model for Science and Society, Hamline University, April 2018
- \*“The Lower Border of Spinozan Belief” at the Institute of Philosophy, University of London, April 2018.
- “Unconscious Perception and Phenomenal Coherence” at the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, San Antonio, TX, March 2018
- \*“Iconic Representation” at Perception and Mental Imagery in Philosophy and Psychology, University of Southampton, January 2018
- “Perceptual Pluralism” (poster) at Thought and Sense conference, University of Oslo, November 2017
- \*“Perceptual Pluralism” at the Oxford Philosophy of Mind Work in Progress Seminar, October 2017
- \*“Unconscious Perception and Phenomenal Coherence” at the Institute of Philosophy, University of London, September 2017
- “Attention and Encapsulation” at Minds Online, September 2017
- \*“Perceptual Pluralism” at the Rutgers-Barnard-Columbia Mind Workshop, Brooklyn, NY, August 2017
- “Attention and Encapsulation” at the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, University of Hertfordshire, August 2017

- “Do Stand-Up Comedians Make Assertions?” at The Ethics and Aesthetics of Stand-Up Comedy, Bucknell University, April 2017 (with Jesse Rappaport)
- “Object Perception as an Origin of Propositional Structure” at the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 109<sup>th</sup> annual meeting, Savannah, GA, March 2017
- \*“Representational Format and the Perception–Cognition Border” at the NEH Summer Institute on Presupposition and Perception, Cornell University, July 2016
- “Representational Format and the Perception–Cognition Border” at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 42<sup>nd</sup> annual meeting, University of Texas, Austin, June 2016
- ^“Dispositionalism and Belief Fragmentation” at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 42<sup>nd</sup> annual meeting, University of Texas, Austin, June 2016 (with Joseph Bendaña)
- ^“Dispositionalism and Belief Fragmentation” at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Fragmentation Workshop, University of Graz, May 2016 (with Joseph Bendaña)
- \*“Iconic Representation” at the New York Philosophy of Perception Workshop, April 2016
- \*“Imagery, Iconicity, and the Format of Perception” at the Workshop on Mental Imagery, University of Antwerp, March 2016
- \*“Seeing Objects: A Case Study in the Under-Intellectualization of Perception” at the New York Philosophy of Perception Workshop, October 2015
- “Cognitive Architecture and Known Illusions in Reid’s Doxastic Theory of Perception” at the Boston University Graduate Philosophy Conference, October 2015.
- “Believing Our Eyes: The Role of False Belief in the Experience of Cinema” at the British Society of Aesthetics, 54<sup>th</sup> annual conference, Oxford University, September 2014
- “Perception, Indeterminacy, and Natural Selection” (poster) at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 40<sup>th</sup> annual meeting, University of British Columbia, June 2014 (with Ryan DeChant)
- \*“The Dual-Component View of Perceptual Experience: Objections and Replies” at the Works in Progress in Philosophy of Perception group, NYU, April 2014
- \*“Perception, Adaptive Function and Indeterminacy: Defending Quine against Burge” at the Works in Progress in Philosophy of Perception group, NYU, April 2014 (with Ryan DeChant)
- “Phenomenal Contrast and Perceptual Belief” at the 14<sup>th</sup> Columbia-NYU Graduate Philosophy Conference, Columbia University, April 2014
- \*“Phenomenal Contrast and Perceptual Belief” at the Works in Progress in Philosophy of Perception group, NYU, March 2014
- “Problems for the Indeterminacy of Translation” at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 39<sup>th</sup> annual meeting, Brown University, June 2013

COMMENTARIES:

Faculty respondent for Andy McKilliam, “Materialists Need Not Explain What It Is Like” at the Oxford Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of Oxford, November 2017

Written comments on Dimitria Gatzia, “Cognitive Penetration and Top-Down Modulation in Visual Perception” at Minds Online, September 2016

Written comments on E.J. Green, “Structure Constancy” at Minds Online, September 2015

Comments on Jessie Munton, “Visual Confidences and Perceptual Justification” at the 18<sup>th</sup> CUNY Philosophy Graduate Conference, The Graduate Center, CUNY, April 2015

Comments on Nick Byrd, “Has Associationism (About Implicit Bias) Been Defeated?” at the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 107<sup>th</sup> annual meeting, New Orleans, LA, April 2015

Comments on E.J. Green, “On Sensory Individuals: Making Room for Surfaces” at the 17<sup>th</sup> CUNY Philosophy Graduate Conference, The Graduate Center, CUNY, April 2014

Comments on Madison Kilbride, “Is the Property of Being a Phoneme Represented in Perceptual Experience?” at the 16<sup>th</sup> CUNY Philosophy Graduate Conference, The Graduate Center, CUNY, April 2013

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**TEACHING & CURRICULUM WORK:**

Primary Instructor:

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

“The Structure of Thought” (Graduate seminar)  
Michaelmas Term 2018

BROOKLYN COLLEGE

“Introduction to the Problems of Philosophy” (200-level course)  
Fall 2014, Spring 2015 (one section per semester)  
Fall 2013, Spring 2014 (two sections per semester)

“Knowledge, Reality, and Value” (100-level course)  
Fall 2012, Spring 2013 (two sections per semester)

Teaching Assistant:

NYU

“Consciousness”—Prof. Ned Block (upper-level undergrad course)  
Spring 2016 (two discussion sections)

Writing Across the Curriculum Fellow:

BROOKLYN COLLEGE

Fall 2015, Spring 2016

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**PROFESSIONAL SERVICE:**

Refereeing: *Mind*, *Noûs*, *Philosophers' Imprint*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Cognitive Science*, *Mind & Language*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Inquiry*, *Journal of Cognitive Science*, *Journal of the APA*, *Journal of Modern Philosophy*, *Synthese*, *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*, *Topoi*, *Theoria*, MIT Press.

Conferences: Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Minds Online.

Committees: The Graduate Center, CUNY, Philosophy Program Colloquium Committee (2014–2015); Society for Philosophy and Psychology, William James Prize Committee (2017; 2019); Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Griffith Prize Committee (2020).

Organizing: The New York Philosophy of Perception Workshop (with Nemira Gasiunas, 2015–2016); Concepts, Pointers, and Occasion-Specific Thoughts (with Nicholas Shea, 3–4 June 2019)

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**REFERENCES:**

**Jesse Prinz**

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The Graduate Center, CUNY  
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**Eric Mandelbaum**

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The Graduate Center & Baruch College,  
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**Christine Vitrano** (*teaching*)

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